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Abstract 
In previous decades, cyber-attacks have not been considered a threat to critical infrastructure. However, as the 
Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) domains converge, the vulnerability of OT 
infrastructure is being exploited. Nation-states, cyber criminals and hacktivists are moving to benefit from 
economic and political gains. The OT network, i.e. Industrial Control System (ICS) is referred to within OT 
infrastructure as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). SCADA systems were introduced primarily 
to optimise the data transfer within OT network infrastructure. The introduction of SCADA can be traced back to 
the 1960’s, a time where cyber-attacks were not considered. Hence SCADA networks and associated systems are 
highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks which can ultimately result in catastrophic events. Historically, when deployed, 
intrusion detection systems in converged IT/OT networks are deployed and monitor the IT side of the network. 
While academic research into OT specific intrusion detection is not a new direction, application to real systems 
are few and lack the contextual information required to make intrusion detection systems actionable. This paper 
provides an overview of cyber security in OT SCADA networks. Through evaluating the historical development of 
OT systems and protocols, a range of current issues caused by the IT/OT convergence is presented. A number of 
publicly disclosed SCADA vulnerabilities are outlined, in addition to approaches for detecting attacks in OT 
networks. The paper concludes with a discussion of what the future of interconnected OT systems should entail, 
and the potential risks of continuing with an insecure design philosophy. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The global cost of cybercrime has risen by 66% to an average cost of USD$11.7 million per organisation since 
2015 (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2017). In Australia, an average per company attributed USD$5.41 million to cyber-
attacks (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2017).  This upward trending figure is potentially catastrophic to the political 
and economic state of a country such as Australia. Following the targeted use of ransomware on critical 
infrastructure such as the Kemuri Water Company (Kovacs, 2016), developing defences, which include detection 
techniques, against the offensive use of cyber weaponry is essential. 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems were introduced to automate processes in industries 
such as oil and gas, water utilities, transportation, power generation and energy. SCADA systems allow operators 
to monitor and communicate with onsite systems remotely through a Human Machine Interface (HMI). This 
action of remotely controlled and monitoring the onsite systems has the advantage of a reduction in labour costs 
and minimise associated errors associated with measurements. Furthermore, inbuilt alarm systems can be 
monitored automatically rather than having humans checking with the risk of potentially miscalculating critical 
data.  
However, increased connectivity has introduced significant vulnerabilities from IT environments that previously 
did not exist in OT environments. Cyber criminals have identified these vulnerabilities and have exploited for 
financial and/or political gain. This paper presents an overview of OT systems, describing historical design 
choices, system architecture, and vulnerabilities introduced from the convergence of IT and OT systems. Next, 
the paper describes intrusion detection methods for OT systems, concluding with a discussion on what is required 
to secure future OT systems from an increasing cyber threat. 
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SCADA SYSTEM EVOLUTION 
As information/data architectures and technology has evolved, including the convergence of IT and OT 
technologies, the evolution of SCADA systems has also followed. SCADA systems started in the 1960’s and are 
commonly separated into four generations:  
 First Generation – Monolithic SCADA Systems; 
 Second Generation – Distributed SCADA Systems; 
 Third Generation – Networked SCADA Systems; and 
 Fourth Generation – “Internet of Things” SCADA Systems (Kudłacik, Porwik, & Wesołowski, 
2016). 
As SCADA systems have evolved, they have adopted open network specifications for communications. The 
evolution of protocols began with proprietary protocols including SCADA vendor specific protocols, e.g. Modbus 
and Profibus, later the SCADA protocols were standardised through, IEC60870, IEC61850 and DNP3. These 
protocols naturally have advantages, disadvantages and commonalities. As with advances in technology, industry 
has increased the availability of control systems from remote locations. This has changed the behaviour that 
SCADA processes the communications data from a predominately standalone system to communicating through 
Wide Area Networks (WANs) and Local Area Networks (LANs) through TCP/IP protocols. Furthermore, the 
improvement of networking technology resulting in network speed increases has increased the uptake of TCP/IP 
protocols within OT systems. These improvements have hastened the move from EIA-232 and EIA-485 (serial) 
to Ethernet and wireless (DigitalBond, 2018) mediums. There has also been a shift in the technology and 
functionality associated with microprocessor devices or intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). This shift is to take 
advantage of the increased network speeds and different transmission mediums, allowing for more complex 
systems with finer timing requirements to be designed.   
SCADA NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
SCADA systems operate on a node-to-node based topology that runs on the Data Link Layer (Layer Two) of the 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model that had been designed as a closed system. SCADA systems are used 
to allow operators to monitor alerts and analyse real-time data collated from distributed processes such as gas 
pipelines, hydroelectric generating facilities and power stations. Traditional SCADA systems are comprised of 
five main components: Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) (Kolhar, Abd El-atty, & Rahmath, 2016), 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Remote Telemetry Unit (RTU), Human Machine Interface (HMI) and 
Historian system. The IEDs are microcomputer sensors that monitor the physical SCADA machine and relay data 
to the PLC or RTU devices. PLCs and RTUs are devices that collect data from the IEDs then transmit the data to 
the HMI application. An HMI is an application installed on a SCADA workstation that interprets the information 
received from the PLC and RTU devices, allowing for a human operator to analyse and monitor the SCADA 
system. The Historian system collects and stores SCADA network data for audit purposes (Nicholson, Webber, 
Dyer, Patel, & Janicke, 2012).  
Figure 1 illustrates a simple SCADA network architecture. Typically, a SCADA network architecture is a tree-
like structure and was designed as a closed system. The convergence of IT and OT systems have changed the 
architecture of OT systems, with HMI workstations often connected to corporate intranets, with remote access 
provided through virtual private networks (VPNs) or other remote access technologies. With these added 
connections, OT infrastructure such as SCADA systems are exposed to vulnerabilities inherited from the IT 
environment, opening vectors for network attacks against the SCADA system.  This has increased the importance 
of securing organisational networks which manage SCADA systems.  
One defensive method is the use of network segregation (Sajid, Abbas, & Saleem, 2016). Network segregation is 
separating an organisational network into sub-networks to mitigate against adversarial activities propagating 
through the organisational network. This technique should be deployed in conjunction with active and passive 
cyber defences. A firewall is an active cyber defence tool, commonly located at the entrance of the segregated 
network (Gao et al., 2014). Firewall rules and policies should be implemented to monitor inbound and outbound 
SCADA network traffic. A correctly configured firewall located on a segregated SCADA network should be 
deployed along with an Intrusion Detection System (Sajid et al., 2016; SURF cert IDS, 2013). An IDS is a passive 
cyber defence tool that monitors network traffic for any anomalous behaviour that could be attributed to 
adversarial activities. An IDS should be placed within the SCADA network allowing for the detection of 
adversarial activities. Though it is important to note that firewalls and IDSs are only as effective as the rules and 
policies configured on these tools. With weaker rules and policies adversarial activities can go undetected on 
SCADA systems. Further, an IDS is only useful when the alerts which are generated are investigated. The use of 
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various defence tools and techniques is known as a defence in depth strategy and should be deployed to mitigate 
the vulnerabilities of OT systems such as SCADA. 
 
Figure 1: A simple SCADA network topology 
Companies by nature aim to increase a return to their shareholders, therefore there is a requirement to optimise 
their respective plants to achieve an increase in production and in turn revenue. This translates to optimised 
performance and reduced overhead costs. To achieve this, access to the OT environment from the IT enterprise 
domain was required to conduct analysis. This forced the convergence of IT to OT. The devices within the OT 
environment were not designed to defend against cyber-attacks like those seen within the IT environment. Hence 
this has left OT devices highly exposed (Murray, Johnstone, & Valli, 2017). Therefore it is acknowledged that 
the increasing complexity of OT networks caused by IT connections requires tailored OT defence measures, such 
as intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems which counter vulnerabilities in both OT devices and 
network protocols (Horkan, 2015). 
SCADA SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES 
SCADA systems started as standalone systems, with a defined gap between the IT systems and the OT systems, 
with no access to the outside world, not alone the Internet. The early associated SCADA protocols were propriety 
and the connections were through an RS-232 low speed serial cable (Shahzad et al., 2016). The original design of 
SCADA systems was to ensure an optimised transfer of data, i.e. no data loss. There wasn’t any thought to the 
SCADA design to include cybersecurity requirements. 
To capture the vulnerability of SCADA systems, it is important to understand how an attack on a traditional IT 
system has different priorities than an attack on an OT system. Traditionally in IT security where the concerns are 
associated with financial integrity, denial of service or loss of information, properties can be grouped into 
confidentiality, integrity and availability or CIA. This is also in the order of importance within an IT system. 
Within an OT system, the order of importance is reversed to availability, integrity and then confidentiality. This 
change of importance is due to the difference in conditions between IT and OT. In IT, data is paramount where 
all processes are within the virtual environment. In OT, production is the number one requirement. There is a 
crossover from the virtual environment to the physical environment, e.g. process control. Therefore in the OT 
environment, there is a  requirement for effective operation of the onsite plant and to ensure data is presented in 
case of an emergency (Murray et al., 2017).  
The purpose of an adversary can range from an individual who is trying to see if they can defeat the defences of 
a plant. Conversely, it could be a nation state for the purposes of industrial espionage. As seen through the Triton 
attack on a middle eastern oil and gas plant where the intent was to cause a high impact attack (Johnson et al., 
2017). Since Stuxnet, publicly reported cyber-attacks against OT systems have increased, a selection of which are 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Selected disclosed OT cyber-attacks, expanded from (Murray et al., 2017) 
Year Cyber Attack Details Outcome 
2010 Stuxnet worm A sophisticated malware was installed via a third-
party contractor using a USB drive to an Iran 
nuclear facility. The malware infected the SCADA 
system controlling the Nuclear centrifuges and 
changed the values and mechanics to behave 
abnormal (Schneier, 2010).  
Nuclear Centrifuges and 
valves were 
sabotaged/destroyed  
 
2011 Steel plant infected 
with Conficker 
worm 
Network and Computer systems infected with the 
Conficker worm, which spread across the 
corporate and OT network systems. 
Communications between the PLCs and field 
devices were flooded, causing most control system 
devices in become unresponsive (RISI, 2015). 
The malware spread 
throughout the network and 
impact the communication 
of SCADA systems and 
field devices, which 
resulted to latency and 
partial outage on the 
SCADA network. 
2012 Computer Virus 
targets Saudi 
Arabian Oil 
Company 
Nation state hackers attacked Saudi Aramco with 
the Shamoon virus which infected 30,000 
computers across the network, wiping hard drives 
(Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 2013). 
30,000 corporate computers 
systems wiped clean. The 
corporate network was 
down for several days. 
2012 Shamoon virus 
affects computers at 
Qatari gas firm 
RasGas 
Qatari gas firm RasGas became infected with the 
Shamoon virus. The attack was believed to be state 
sponsored (Mills, 2012). 
The website and corporate 
network of the organisation 
was impacted for several 
days. 
2012 Canadian Software 
Manufacturing 
Company Firewall 
Breach 
Adversaries compromised the firewall system of 
Telvent Canada Ltd, stealing critical project 
SCADA files that were related to the OASyS 
SCADA project (Krebs, 2012) 
Theft of critical and 
sensitive project files 
related to SCADA systems. 
2012 US Power Plant 
Infected with 
Malware 
The malware was identified on a USB drive used 
for control system configuration backups in a US 
nuclear powerplant (Sanger, 2013).  
Compromised ICS system 
with an undisclosed impact 
to the operation.  
2014 US Public utility 
compromise 
Adversaries compromised a security system at a 
US public utility through a brute-force password 
attack (Kirk, 2014). 
The system was not directly 
connected to other OT 
equipment due to 
maintenance. 
2014 Dragonfly Group 
Energy Industry 
reconnaissance 
campaign  
Reported that adversary group called Dragonfly 
have been targeting the energy sector in the US 
and Europe. Using IT based vectors, such as 
phishing emails to pivot into OT networks (Braga, 
2017). 
Undisclosed, expected loss 
of critical assets 
information and business 
operations process 
2014 German Steel Mill 
attack 
A German Steel Mill was breached using social 
engineering vectors to enter the company network 
and further compromise the control system 
network. The compromise resulted in preventing a 
blast furnace from shutting down when required 
(Robert M Lee, Asante, & Conway, 2014).  
Catastrophic damage to the 
steel mill.  
 
2015 Blackenergy3 
Ukraine power grid 
cyber-attack 
A suspected nation state adversary group attacked 
a regional Ukraine power company, compromising 
the ICS network causing a 3 hour power outage  
(Robert M. Lee, Assante, & Conway, 2016). 
225,000 customers lost 
power, deleted files from 
the master boot records and 
shut down communications.  
2015 Kemuri Water Plant  Adversary compromised a water utility online 
billing system, pivoting into the SCADA network 
servers and holding the utility company ransom 
(Leyden, 2016). 
Modified chlorine and 
chemical levels on the 
water used at the treatment 
plants. 2.5 million customer 
details stolen. 
2017 Triton An oil and gas plant in Saudi Arabia was 
compromised through remote access to an engineer 
workstation. The adversary reprogrammed 
controller units, causing fail safes to occur shutting 
down the plant (Johnson et al., 2017). 
Failsafe systems worked 
correctly  
 
Proceedings of the 16th Australian Information Security Management Conference (2018) 100
APPROACHES TO DETECTING NETWORK ATTACKS IN OT 
For detection of system-level events on specific devices operating in OT, operating system logs, and host-based 
intrusion detection systems can be used. Host-Based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) monitor for system 
changes in the device which the system monitors. HIDS however, utilise resources on the device it is monitoring 
and thus are not commonly used in OT devices due to device resource constraints. System logs detail events which 
occur on a device at an operating system-level and network-level. System logs are generated automatically by IT 
devices but are not generated by default in OT devices. Typically, system logs from both device types when 
available are sent to a server device for correlation and analysis. A downside of system logs in general is the 
potential for tampering by an adversary. Given the data provided to the log server is provided by a potentially 
untrustworthy source, i.e the adversary-controlled device, system logs may provide less meaningful data for 
sophisticated, targeted attacks undertaken by organised adversaries, such as the BlackEnergy malware kit (MITRE 
ATT&CK, 2018). 
Network capture is used as part of Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). Network captures record 
network traffic occurring over a network, often using a standalone device and either at a flow-level or packet-
level. Network flows describe a series of network packets over a defined time duration, keeping high-level 
information such as source, destination, protocol and packet length (J. Quittek, 2004). Packet level captures record 
all information for each individual packet traversing a network. Due to finite storage requirements, network flows 
are often used given the reduced storage requirement, however, the lack of semantic knowledge of the underlying 
processes provided by network flows restricts their applicability to actionable detection measures (Hofstede et al., 
2014). Conversely, deep packet inspection provides all the semantic data regarding each network transaction, with 
the added cost of increased storage. Drawing meaning from this wealth of knowledge however, is challenging, as 
detection systems can be overwhelmed with noise. Filtering the noise is required to identify appropriate indicators 
for detection. Indicators can be derived from expert knowledge of the individual system, learnt automatically 
using machine learning approaches, or a combination of automated learning and expert acceptance. 
For intrusion detection systems, there are two core designations, misuse (signature) based, and anomaly based. 
Misuse based approaches are highly accurate at detecting known malicious events, given a rule is developed/exists 
and is used. However, they cannot detect unknown attacks (Yuksel, den Hartog, & Etalle, 2016).  Signatures exist 
for a range of OT protocols, including ModBus, S7 and DNP3 (Bro, 2018; DigitalBond, 2018; Open Information 
Security Foundation, 2018b) , through a range of open source signature IDS systems, such as Bro, Snort, Suricata 
and Yara (Amann et al., 2018; CISCO, 2018; Open Information Security Foundation, 2018a; VirusTotal, 2018). 
Alternatively, anomaly-based approaches use a learned model of normal transactions to identify anomalies in 
data, based on either protocol semantics, process data, network transaction probabilities or physical process 
models. A range of anomaly approaches based on the use of machine learning exist in literature such as (Carcano 
et al., 2011; Caselli, Zambon, & Kargl, 2015; Yuksel et al., 2016), however, commercial machine learning 
anomaly detection approaches are typically closed source. The difficulty with anomaly detection is understanding 
what detected anomalies mean in the context of the system.  For this reason, systems which automatically act on 
anomalies are detrimental in OT networks, given the potential effect and risk to system availability if a false 
positive is acted upon (NIST, 2007). While OT systems are more static than IT systems, if the behaviour is not 
learnt during the training process, it will be classified as an anomalous action, even if it is a low interaction normal 
device. Further, if adversary actions are already taking place in the network, the malicious behaviour may be 
baselined (NIST, 2007). A means of online learning is required to increase the usability of many anomaly 
detection approaches for OT systems. 
DISCUSSION 
The convergence of IT and OT systems has left OT devices exposed, as outlined by attack vectors used in OT 
cyber-attacks. As noted by (Gregory-Brown, 2107) the devices that are perceived to be at the highest risk are IT 
devices such as servers and workstations. These devices provide the entry vectors into OT systems and networks 
through IT based vulnerabilities and then pivot into the internal OT network (Knapp & Langill, 2015). A summary 
of attack vectors for 39 reported attacks collated from the RISI database between 2010 and 2014 are outlined in 
Table 2. While the majority are undisclosed from this database, initial attack vectors are not complex, with 
unauthorised access in these cases achieved through default credentials, or insider attackers, while USB based 
entry vectors traverse network defences. Domain awareness of OT cyber threats is increasing with (Schwab 
Wolfgang & Mathieu, 2018) reporting 77% of respondents identifying ICS cybersecurity as a major priority in 
2018. A major challenge is the slow pace of OT system lifecycles when compared to IT systems.  
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Table 2: OT entry vectors collated from RISI (2015) 
Entry Vector Total Reported (%) 
Undisclosed 22 (56.4%) 
Unauthorised Access 9 (23.1%) 
USB 6 (15.4%) 
Social Engineering 1 (2.6%) 
Phishing 1 (2.6%) 
 
OT environments such as SCADA systems were designed as closed systems, however the IT and OT convergence 
has resulted in SCADA systems being connected to other networks including enterprise networks and the Internet 
for productivity increases. Additionally, the order of security concerns within an IT environment is different to 
those of the OT environment. Confidentiality of data is considered to be of utmost importance within the IT 
environment, while the availability of data and services is of utmost importance within the OT environment 
(Rezai, Keshavarzi, & Moravej, 2017; Zhu, Joseph, & Sastry, 2011). Given the differences in both environments, 
IT based detection techniques are not adequate to detect OT threats (Keith Stouffer, Victoria Pillitteri, Suzanne 
Lightman, Marshall Abrams, & Hahn, 2015). The focus of current research is on OT specific detection techniques 
and method (Cherdantseva et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2014) 
Detection in OT systems should leverage the wealth of knowledge provided by IT systems. Correlating system, 
network and threat intelligence alerts between IT and OT systems can provide a whole system view for security 
analysts who draw meaning from these complex interconnected systems. Given that the entry vector for OT cyber-
attacks are typically IT based due to system convergence, drawing inferences between actions in the whole system 
will provide efficient, actionable remediations. 
A key to having secure and controlled OT network and environments is hardening OT networks and systems with 
a security focus. A deep understanding of both OT network architectures and IT network systems is required to 
harden the environment. A defence in depth approach is key to hardening OT networks, including network 
segmentation, firewalls and intrusion detection systems. However, securing OT systems requires more than 
technical solutions. Policy, both internal and industry compliance, staff training and testable incident response 
plans are also required (NIST, 2015).  
Current anomaly detection approaches for OT systems rely on identifying variations in features of interest to 
identify anomalies. These features are typically frequency based, such as an increase in connections from a host, 
when compared to historical learnt behaviours. These features can be learnt from network data, process-based 
semantics such as device or protocol definitions, and behaviours defined by system experts. The end result of 
current anomaly detection alarms is an indicator that a value has deviated from normal. Additional semantic 
meaning is required to evaluate if this is an indication of a cyber-attack or an infrequent normal action. Advanced 
adversarial threats can overcome existing anomaly detection approaches when conforming to normal learnt action. 
However, combining categorical data, such as command type or function code, with frequency based and time-
based features into compound features provides both additional semantic meaning to alerts, in addition to richer 
classification approaches. For example, using a write function may be defined as a normal action between two 
devices, but added contextual behaviour, such as the value being written, and the time of transaction may indicate 
a network attack when compared to normal operations. Future anomaly detection approaches for OT systems 
should incorporate both process level semantics, and contextual behaviour to improve the rigour of anomaly 
detection. 
Ultimately, improved security of OT systems requires a fundamental change in the development mindset of OT 
systems. From the hardware-level to high-level network protections, future OT networks will need to be designed 
to be robust and secure, while maintaining the safety and availability requirements as convergence between IT 
and OT systems manifests into the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Further, the protocols which are currently 
used in OT systems require updating to modern secure design standards. Existing protocols are insecure by design 
and attempts to secure these protocols are met with resistance, or not integrated due to the optionality requirements 
of the security functions for backwards compatibility with existing systems. Schneider Electric has recently 
undertaken this process with the creation of Secure Modbus TCP, which uses Transport Layer Security (TLS), 
digital certificates and role-based access control (Desruisseaux, 2018). While rebuilding protocols to embed 
security from design can be costly, this approach to improving the security of OT protocols will provide the robust 
security requirements of future connected OT systems. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper sought to highlight current detection techniques in OT systems, and identify existing known challenges 
and goals for the next generation of OT system, the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).  OT systems such as 
SCADA systems were originally designed as closed systems. However, the evolution of information/data 
architectures and the convergence of IT and OT environments has driven the evolution of SCADA systems to 
adopt an open network specification for communications. With the inclusion of added connections due to the 
adaptation of an open network, OT infrastructure such as SCADA systems are exposed to vulnerabilities inherited 
from the IT environment, opening vectors for network attacks against the SCADA system. In recent years cyber-
attacks have been launched exploiting vulnerabilities against OT systems.  
Mitigation strategies such as a defence in depth security approach to hardening OT networks could be 
implemented. In addition to gathering threat intelligence alerts from both IT and OT environments as well as 
incorporating process level semantics and contextual behaviour for an anomaly based detection approach. As the 
latest evolution of OT systems are IIoT based, rebuilding OT protocols with security embedded in the design is 
costly but will provide the robust security requirements of future connected OT systems. 
REFERENCES 
Amann, Azoff, Fleury, Grigorescu, Hall, Paxson, . . . Vallentin. (2018). Bro Network Security Monitor. Retrieved 
from https://www.bro.org/ 
Braga, M. (2017). Russia-linted hackers infiltrated US and European energy companies, security firm finds. CBC 
News. Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/russia-dragonfly-energetic-bear-hacking-
energy-us-symantec-1.4276999 
Bro. (2018). Bro Protocol Analysers. Retrieved from https://www.bro.org/sphinx/script-reference/proto-
analyzers.html 
Bronk, C., & Tikk-Ringas, E. (2013). The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco. Survival, 55(2), 81-96. 
doi:10.1080/00396338.2013.784468 
Carcano, A., Coletta, A., Guglielmi, M., Masera, M., Fovino, I. N., & Trombetta, A. (2011). A Multidimensional 
Critical State Analysis for Detecting Intrusions in SCADA Systems. Industrial Informatics, IEEE 
Transactions on, 7(2), 179-186.  
Caselli, M., Zambon, E., & Kargl, F. (2015). Sequence-aware Intrusion Detection in Industrial Control Systems. 
Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security. 
Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H., & Stoddart, K. (2016). A review of 
cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. Computers & Security, 56, 1-27. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.09.009 
CISCO. (2018). Snort. Retrieved from https://www.snort.org/ 
Desruisseaux. (2018). Modbus Security - New Protocol to Improve Control System Security.  Retrieved from 
https://blog.schneider-electric.com/machine-and-process-management/2018/08/30/modbus-security-
new-protocol-to-improve-control-system-security/ 
DigitalBond. (2018). Digital Bond's IDS/IPS rules for ICS and ICS protocols. . Retrieved from 
https://github.com/digitalbond/Quickdraw-Snort 
Gao, J., Liu, J., Rajan, B., Nori, R., Fu, B., Xiao, Y., . . . Chen, C. L. P. (2014). SCADA communication and 
security issues. Security and Communication Networks, 7(1), 175-194. doi:10.1002/sec.698 
Gregory-Brown, B. (2107). Securing Industrial Control Systems - A SANS Survey. Retrieved from 
https://www.belden.com/hubfs/resources/knowledge/white-papers/sans-survey-report-ics-
security.pdf?hsLang=en&t=1531332510474 
Hofstede, R., Čeleda, P., Trammell, B., Drago, I., Sadre, R., Sperotto, A., & Pras, A. (2014). Flow Monitoring 
Explained: From Packet Capture to Data Analysis With NetFlow and IPFIX. IEEE Communications 
Surveys & Tutorials, 16(4), 2037-2064. doi:10.1109/COMST.2014.2321898 
Proceedings of the 16th Australian Information Security Management Conference (2018) 103
Horkan, M. (2015). Challenges for IDS/IPS Development in Industrial Control Systesms. Retrieved from 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/challenges-ids-ips-deployment-industrial-control-
systems-36127 
J. Quittek, T. Z., B. Claise and S. Zander. (2004). RFC3917: Requirements for IP Flow Information Export 
(IPFIX) (RFC3917). Retrieved from Online:  
Johnson, B., Caban, D., Krotofil, M., Scali, D., Brubaker, N., & Glyer, C. (2017). Attackers Deploy New ICS 
Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure.   Retrieved 
from https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-
framework-triton.html 
Keith Stouffer, Victoria Pillitteri, Suzanne Lightman, Marshall Abrams, & Hahn, A. (2015). Guide to Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved from 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf 
Kirk, J. (2014). Public utility compromised after brute-force attack, DHS says. Computer World. Retrieved from 
https://www.computerworld.com.au/article/545681/public_utility_compromised_after_brute-
force_attack_dhs_says/ 
Knapp, E. D., & Langill, J. T. (2015). Chapter 3 - Industrial Cyber Security History and Trends. In E. D. Knapp 
& J. T. Langill (Eds.), Industrial Network Security (Second Edition) (pp. 41-57). Boston: Syngress. 
Kolhar, M., Abd El-atty, S. M., & Rahmath, M. (2016). Storage allocation scheme for virtual instances of cloud 
computing. Neural Computing and Applications. doi:10.1007/s00521-015-2173-8 
Kovacs, E. (2016). Attackers Alter Water Treatment Systems in Utility Hack: Report.   Retrieved from 
https://www.securityweek.com/attackers-alter-water-treatment-systems-utility-hack-report 
Krebs, B. (2012). Chinese Hackers Blamed for Intrusion at Energy Industry Giant Telvent.  Retrieved from 
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/chinese-hackers-blamed-for-intrusion-at-energy-industry-giant-
telvent/ 
Kudłacik, P., Porwik, P., & Wesołowski, T. (2016). Fuzzy approach for intrusion detection based on user’s 
commands. Soft Computing, 20(7), 2705-2719. doi:10.1007/s00500-015-1669-6 
Lee, R. M., Asante, M. J., & Conway, T. (2014). German Steel Mill Cyber Attack.    
Lee, R. M., Assante, M. J., & Conway, T. (2016). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid  
Leyden, J. (2016). Water treatment plant hacked, chemical mix changed for tap supplies. The Register. Retrieved 
from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/03/24/water_utility_hacked/ 
Mills, E. (2012). Virus knocks out computers at Qatari gas firm RasGas. CNET. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnet.com/news/virus-knocks-out-computers-at-qatari-gas-firm-rasgas/ 
MITRE ATT&CK. (2018). Indicator Removal on Host.   Retrieved from 
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/ 
Murray, G., Johnstone, M. N., & Valli, C. (2017). Thee convergence of IT and OT in critical infrastructure. Paper 
presented at the The Proceedings of 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference, 
Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. 
Nicholson, A., Webber, S., Dyer, S., Patel, T., & Janicke, H. (2012). SCADA security in the light of Cyber-
Warfare. Computers & Security, 31(4), 418-436. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2012.02.009 
NIST. (2007). Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) NIST. 
NIST. (2015). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security: US Department of Commerce. 
Open Information Security Foundation. (2018a). Suricata Open Source IDS / IPS / NSM engine Retrieved from 
https://suricata-ids.org/ 
Open Information Security Foundation. (2018b). suricata/rules/modbus-events.rules. Retrieved from 
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/blob/master/rules/modbus-events.rules 
Proceedings of the 16th Australian Information Security Management Conference (2018) 104
Ponemon Institute LLC. (2017). Cost Of Cyber Crime Study - Insights On The Security Investments That Make A 
Difference Retrieved from https://www.accenture.com/t20170926T072837Z__w__/us-
en/_acnmedia/PDF-61/Accenture-2017-CostCyberCrimeStudy.pdf 
Rezai, A., Keshavarzi, P., & Moravej, Z. (2017). Key management issue in SCADA networks: A review. 
Engineering Science and Technology, an International Journal, 20(1), 354-363. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jestch.2016.08.011 
RISI. (2015). RISI Online Incident Database.   https://www.risidata.com/Database 
Sajid, A., Abbas, H., & Saleem, K. (2016). Cloud-Assisted IoT-Based SCADA Systems Security: A Review of 
the State of the Art and Future Challenges. IEEE Access, 4, 1375-1384. 
doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2549047 
Sanger, D. E. (2013). US plants hit by USB stick malware attack. BBC. Retrieved from 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-21042378 
Schneier, B. (2010). The Story Behind teh Stuxnet Virus. Forbes. Retrieved from 
https://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/iran-nuclear-computer-technology-security-stuxnet-worm.html - 
4352814851e8 
Schwab Wolfgang, & Mathieu, P. (2018). The State of Industrial Cybersecurity 2018. Retrieved from 
https://ics.kaspersky.com/media/2018-Kaspersky-ICS-Whitepaper.pdf 
Shahzad, A., Lee, M., Xiong, N., Jeong, G., Lee, Y.-K., Choi, J.-Y., . . . Ahmad, I. (2016). A Secure, Intelligent, 
and Smart-Sensing Approach for Industrial System Automation and Transmission over Unsecured 
Wireless Networks. Sensors, 16(3), 322.  
SURF cert IDS. (2013). SURF cert IDS.   Retrieved from http://ids.surfnet.nl/wiki/doku.php 
VirusTotal. (2018). YARA. Retrieved from https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/v3.7.0/ 
Yuksel, O., den Hartog, J., & Etalle, S. (2016). Reading Between the Fields: Practical, Effective Intrusion 
Detection for Industrial Control Systems. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 31st Annual ACM 
Symposium on Applied Computing. 
Zhu, B., Joseph, A., & Sastry, S. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Paper presented at 
the Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Internet of Things and 4th International 
Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing.  
 
Proceedings of the 16th Australian Information Security Management Conference (2018) 105
